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A Reply to Dean Acheson
(Editor's Note: Following the delivery of the remarks by
Dean Acheson at the Section luncheon on May 24, the Editor
invited Professor Myres S. McDougal to submit such written
response as he might think fit and just. Professor McDougal
has requested that the following excerpts from his article
"Rhodesia and the United Nations: The lawfulness of Inter-
national Concern," 62 AJIL 1-19 (1968) be printed in The
International Lawyer.)
* * * The present organization of government within Rhodesia
reflects a highly discriminatory restrictiveness in participation
rather than the widest possible sharing. The franchise system,
which was carried in amended form into the 1961 Constitution
assures that 6% white population dominance in every aspect
of internal public order.8 The proclaimed goal of the white settler
elite is to maintain this system of domination." * * * 19
8 See Southern Rhodesia Constitution, Part II-Detailed Provisions, Ap-
pendix 1 at 27 ff., and see also ibid. at 12. Cmnd. 1400 (1961).
9 Despite numerous statements of benevolence and expressions of genuine
commitment to effective democracy, it is quite difficult to avoid concluding that
the unilateral declaration of independence was undertaken by the white
Rhodesian minority precisely in order to avoid realization of the most funda-
mental tenet of democracy-the effective sharing of power. We note, in this
respect, the following statements of Prime Minister Ian Smith, the last of
which was delivered in December, 1966: "I cannot in all honesty claim that
I am an advocate of majority rule." "We will never negotiate with Britain
while Mr. Wilson is in his present position because he is waiting for us to
reach the position of one man, one vote and this will not happen in my
lifetime or Mr. Wilson's lifetime." Quoted by Congressman Rosenthal of New
York, Cong. Rec., Feb. 9, 1967, H 1246.
19 A detailed survey of Rhodesian enactments, as reported in the Western
press, is beyond the scope of this article. See, generally, New York Times,
Jan. 17, 1965, p. 3, col. 2; March 23, p. 14, col. 6; April 13, p. 8, col. 7;
May 27, p. 6, col. 7; May 28, p. 2, col. 5; May 29, p. 8, col. 8; June 2, p. 6,
col. 1; July 15, p. 19, col. 8; Oct. 24, p. 7, col. 1; Oct. 28, p. 1, col. 5; Nov. 6,
p. 1, col. 6; Nov. 7, p. 1, col. 2; Nov. 12, p. 1, col. 8; Nov. 17, p. 1, col. 5;
Nov. 23, p. 1, col. 1. See also Special Committee on the Situation with regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and People (1965) (A/5800/Rev. 1; A/6000/Rev. 1). For
more detailed and even more disquieting surveys, see Leys, "The Growth of
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* * * The basic substantive argument which has been lodged
against the legality of the United Nations' Rhodesian action
is that the activities of the white regime in Rhodesia cannot
be appropriately characterized as constituting "a threat to the
peace" within the meaning of the Charter. Hence, no matter
how reprehensible white Rhodesian behavior may be, the basic
contingency for the United Nations' measures is absent. Three
contentions have been adduced in support of this argument: that
the activities of the Rhodesian authorities contain no element
of aggression;2 1 that the activities of such authorities are wholly
Police Powers and the 1959 Emergencies," in Leys and Pratt, A New Deal in
Central Africa 131 (1960); Hasson, "Rhodesia-A Police State?" 22 The
World Today 181 (1966).
An accurate grasp of the effects of the Rhodesian system upon the majority
of the population can only be gained by relation of legislation to context:
".. . a misleading impression might be obtained from superficial study of
Southern Rhodesia legislation, which largely avoids reference to race ... "
Palley, op. cit. note 2 above, at vii. Thus, for example, the constitutional system
of enfranchisement, based largely on wealth criteria, can only be understood in
light of the Land Apportionment Act of 1943, under which half of the best
land was allocated for white use, i.e., for less than six percent of the population.
Industry is controlled by the whites and the African worker receives one-
twelfth the wage which a European receives for the same work. Keatley, The
Politics of Partnership (1963). Application of the Preventive Detention
Act of 1959, the Vagrancy Act and the notorious Law and Order (Maintenance)
Act of 1960 have had enormously deprivatory effects upon the black popu-
lation in almost all sectors of internal public order. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant indicator of the increasing authoritarian character of the Rhodesian regime
has been the effective diminution of the power of the courts, particularly in
view of their supervisory r6le in regard to human rights matters, as envisaged
in the Constitution of 1961. In Central African Examiner (Pvt) Ltd. v.
Howman and Others NN.O., the earliest test of the legality of the rebel regime,
counsel for one of the government ministries warned the court that "certain dire
consequences might overtake the court if it 'took sides' in what amounted to
a political struggle between British and Rhodesian governments"; the court
in that case refused to be intimidated. 1966(2) S.A. 7. (R.) at 14, quoted
in Palley, "The Judicial Process: U.D.I. and the Southern Rhodesian Judiciary,"
30 Modern Law Review 263, 269, 270 (1967). But in the recent cases of
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O. and Others, and 'Baron v. Ayre N.O.
and Others, Judgment No. GD/CIV/23/66, discussed in Palley, op. cit. passim,
the Rhodesian court, avoiding direct rulings on the legitimacy of the local
regime, upheld the lawfulness of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law
and Order) Regulations in regard to the detention of opponents of the authori-
ties, despite the fact that such measures would probably have been materially
unlawful in the pre-U.D.I. period. For a comprehensive critique of the decision,
see Welsh, "The Constitutional Case in Southern Rhodesia," 83 Law Quarterly
Review 64 (1967).
21 Thus, Representative Selden of Alabama: "But what international crime
has Rhodesia committed? Whose borders has Rhodesia invaded? What section
of the charter of the United Nations has this small African nation violated? On
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lawful under generally accepted international law;2 2 and that, in
any case, all such activities transpire within the geographic
bounds of Rhodesia.23 A careful appraisal of the relevant poli-
cies and of the facts of the case will, however, indicate that the
Charter provisions have been misunderstood and that, in the
absence of an appropriate understanding of the relevant basic
policies, the factual elements have not been properly appre-
ciated.
For the better securing of the most fundamental Charter
purpose of maintaining "international peace and security," the
framers of the United Nations Charter deliberately conferred
upon the Security Council, in the provisions of Chapter VII, a
very broad competence both to "determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
and to decide upon what measures should be taken to "maintain
or restore international peace and security." 24 Thus, the Con-
what basis does Great Britain argue that Rhodesia has become a threat to the
peace?" Cong. Rec., House, April 12, 1967, H 4029.
On the same day, Representative Gurney of Florida asked rhetorically:
"Whose peace is Rhodesia breaching besides Harold Wilson's?" Ibid., at H 4035.
See also the remarks of Congressman Bray of Indiana, ibid., at 4031. See also
Kilpatrick, "Rhodesia and U.N. Charter," The Plain Dealer, Jan. 5, 1967;
editorial in the Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1966, p. A 20, col. 2; letter to the
Washington Post, entitled "Acheson on Rhodesia," Dec. 11, 1966, p. E 6,
cols. 5-6.
22 Acheson, loc. cit. note 21 above. The Washington Post, speaking edi-
torially, had characterized the acts of the white minority as "transgressions."
Former Secretary of State Acheson responded: "But you bother me when you
speak of 'the white minority's transgressions.' Transgressions against what?
What international obligations have they violated?" On April 12, 1967, Con-
gressman Bray of Indiana asked on the floor of the House: "Just what has
Rhodesia done? It has not supported a worldwide conspiracy of espionage and
subversion. Its armies are not poised for an attack on its neighbors. It has not
given support to or encouraged guerrilla warfare in Africa or anywhere else.
It has threatened no one, and wants nothing more than acceptance into the
community of nations as an independent state, ready and willing to live in peace
and honor its international obligations." Cong. Rec., House, April 12, 1967,
H 4031.
23 See the remarks of Congressman Selden, loc. cit. note 21 above. "The
white minority's transgressions have occurred within the boundaries of one
country . . ."; the Washington Post, loc. cit. note 21 above; on Dec. 14, 1966,
the Washington Post returned to this point: "they (sanctions) amount to inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of another country merely because of the form of
government practiced there." "... whatever the Rhodesians have done has
been wholly within their own country . . ." Acheson, loc. cit. note 21 above.
24 Art. 24(1) of the Charter provides: "In order to ensure prompt and effec-
tive action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf." Art. 39, which introduces Chapter VII of the
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ference Committee which drafted these provisions reported, in
answer to proposed amendments for advance specification, that
it had been decided "to leave to the Council the entire decision
as to what constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression," 25 and a comparable discretion
in the choice of measures for maintaining or restoring peace
and security was written into the very words of the relevant
sections of Chapter VII.26
The thought which moved the framers, in rejecting all
proposed definitions of the key terms "threat to the peace,"
"breach of the peace" and "act of aggression," was that, for
effective discharge of the very difficult and delicate task being
imposed upon it, the Security Council should be accorded a
large freedom to make ad hoc determinations after a full, con-
textual examination of the peculiar features of each specific
situation of threat or coercion. The facts which might in the
future endanger international peace and security could be in-
finitely various, with the significance of any particular feature
of the context being a function of many other features, and the
measures which might best promote the establishment and
maintenance of peace and security in any specific situation
could require careful tailoring to fit the unique requirements
of that situation." r The course of subsequent events has clearly
Charter-Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression-provides, in its entirety, that: "The Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of agression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
25 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 505.
26 Thus, Art. 40 authorizes the Council, "in order to prevent an aggravation
of the situation," to "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such pro-
visional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." Art. 41 authorizes the
Council to take "measures not involving the use of armed force to give effect to
its decisions," and Art. 42 provides that "Should the Security Council consider
that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved
to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Although
Art. 42 does not limit the coercive modalities to which the Security Council may
resort, it specifically cites "demonstrations" and "blockades and other opera-
tions" as lawful.
27 Thus, in the Greek frontier incidents of 1947, the Council resolved that
supporting armed bands in crossing into another state should be characterized
"as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United
Nations." But the Council qualified this communication as being only a point
of view and reserved for itself the necessity of determining whether the future
occurrence of such a case would, in fact, constitute a threat to the peace.
Security Council, 2nd Year, Official Records, No. 66, 170th meeting, pp. 1604,
1612. For a general evaluation, see 2 Repertory of Practice of United Nations
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demonstrated the wisdom of this view, and few voices have been
heard to suggest that the broad discretion of the Security
Council could rationally be curtailed.
Similarly, it was clearly within the expectations of both
the framers and the general community that action by the Se-
curity Council might have to be anticipatory and was not
required to await the full consummation of disaster. Thus,
the competence accorded to the Council in Article 39 relates
not merely to perfected "breaches of the peace" and "acts of
aggression" but explicitly extends also to the prevention and
removal of "threats to the peace." 28 Even the inherited cus-
tomary international law of self-defense, which authorizes states
confronted with an imminent threat to their territorial integrity
or political independence to employ the military instrument,
does not require target states to remain immobilized, in the
posture of sitting ducks, for a first blow.2 It could not be ex-
pected that basic constitutional policies would impose more
rigid requirements upon the organized general community
as a prerequisite to the employment of a wide range of sanc-
tioning measures. On the contrary, the potentialities that inhere
in a "policy of prevention" and of appropriate sanctioning
measures to secure such a policy have come to be widely
accepted.30
It may require emphasis, further, that, as the legislative
history of Article 39 anticipates and subsequent practice con-
firms, the Security Council is authorized to find a "threat to
the peace" in a specific situation without an allocation of blame
or fault to any of the parties. The finding of a "threat to the
peace" is a factual determination only, though an indispensable
procedure for establishing the authoritative base for sanc-
tioning measures. When peace is threatened, the function of
the United Nations is to restore peace and its necessary sup-
porting conditions as quickly and as economically as possible.
Organs 354-356 (1955). Comparable reticence to limit itself to a rigid position
in the future characterized the Council's response to Syrian-Israeli clashes in
January, 1956. 1 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supp., Vol. 1,
p. 330 (1958).
28 Attention should also be given to the two terms, employed in Art. 39, signi-
fying the dual objectives of the Council, operating under Chap. VII: measures
may be taken "to maintain or restore...." While "restore" clearly refers to
remedial action subsequent to a perfected breach of the peace, "maintain" refers
to preliminary action aimed at removing or forestalling an imminent threat to
the peace which has not yet materialized into a "breach."
29 CI. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 192-
193, footnote 164 (1961).
30 See Hammarskjbld, "The United Nations and Preventive Action," Press
Conference, Feb. 27, 1956, in Hammarskjbld, Servant of Peace 133-135
(1962).
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In this age of instant Armageddon, small solace could be
gained from a realization that civilization was destroyed for
"good" and not "evil" reasons. Fiat justitia pereat mundus
is not the principal underpinning of Article 39. The determina-
tions of "threats to the peace" which have been made in the
past have related to highly diversified fact complexes, but have,
significantly, not hitherto sought to impute responsibility to a
particular state. The invariable formulation has been that a
"situation" constitutes a threat to the peaceA1 Commenting
upon identical language in a related provision of the Charter,
the International Court observed that the Charter
• . . speak(s) of "situations" as well as disputes, and it
must lie within the power of the Security Council to police
a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement
action against a State.3 2
Indeed, in a critical moment when humanity might rapidly
approach the point of nuclear immolation, the question of who
was responsible would be neither a relevant nor an intelligent
consideration for those charged with avoiding irretrievable
disaster.
It is not intended, however, to suggest that the broad com-
petence accorded the Security Council to make determina-
tions of "threats to the peace" is absolute, without limit or safe-
guard. The appropriate exercise of such competence must of
course require an evaluation of any alleged "threat" in its
relevant context and the relation of such challenged activity
to the major Charter purpose of maintaining international peace
and security; 33 and the Charter, like other constitutions which
confer broad competences for action, establishes certain im-
portant procedural safeguards against arbitrary and spurious
decisions. The expectations of the general community about
the requirements and consequences of an appropriate decision
31 This past practice is not, of course, indicative of a constitutional incapacity
on the part of the Security Council to identify the party responsible for breaching
the peace or creating a threat to the peace. The point to be emphasized is
that the Council, in exercising its powers under Chap. VII, is concerned pri-
marily with maintaining or restoring the peace and only secondarily with
determining who is responsible for the crisis.
32 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the
Charter), [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 167; 56 A.J.I.L. 1053 (1962).
13 Thus, Art. 24 of the Charter, after conferring on the Security Council
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,"
continues in its second paragraph: "In discharging these duties the Security
Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the
discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII."
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by the Security Council are indicated in a dictum of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case:
The primary place ascribed to international peace and
security is natural, since the fulfillment of the other
purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that
basic condition. These purposes are broad indeed, but
neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate them
are unlimited. Save as they have entrusted the Organiza-
tion with the attainment of these common ends, the
Member States retain their freedom of action. But when
the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion
that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the
stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption
is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.3 4
The procedural safeguards established by the Charter are
incorporated in the voting procedures prescribed for the
Security Council, which require the concurring votes of the
permanent members and a special majority of all members."3
The probabilities of arbitrary or spurious decisions escaping
these procedures would not appear great.3 6
The important criticisms of the Rhodesian Resolution, as
we have noted above, relate more to the relevant substantive
criteria than to the procedures by which the decision was taken.
Indeed, it would not appear that any plausible question could
be raised about the conformity of the decision to the stipulated
34 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 168.
35 Charter, Art. 27(3). Portugal and South Africa have criticized the Se-
curity Council's decision on the ground that all permanent members did not
affirmatively concur (the U.S.S.R. and France abstained). A number of other
commentators have challenged the legality of the decision in this respect.
Any lingering questions regarding the lawfulness of Council practice in this
regard are dispelled in Stavropoulos, "The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions
by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph
3, of the Charter of the United Nations," 61 A.J.I.L. 737 (1967). See also
Higgins: ". . . as early as 1947 . . . the Security Council was required to
decide whether the expression 'including the concurring votes of the Permanent
Members' meant their affirmative votes: or whether abstention, though not
casting a negative vote, could be taken to mean 'concurrence'. It was then
decided, and has since been confirmed on some 107 separate occasions that
I am aware of, that the Permanent Members shall be deemed 'to concur' if
they abstain. If they wish to prevent the passage of a resolution, they may do
so by casting a negative vote." Higgins, "International Law, Rhodesia and the
U.N.," 23 The World Today 94, 97 (1967).
36 It is for this reason that, in an effort to establish the utmost finality ob-
tainable through procedural criteria, the Charter makes no provision for
appeal from a decision by the Security Council and prescribes in Article 25
that all Members are obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Council.
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Charter procedures. For demonstrating that the decision is, in
its substantive merits, no less in accord with the basic policies
established by the Charter, the most economic mode of exposi-
tion will be by way of explicit answer to each of the specific
contentions which have been urged against the lawfulness of the
decision.
The first argument against the lawfulness of the decision
is that the actions of the white Rhodesians contain no element
of aggression: ". . . whatever the Rhodesians have done has
been wholly within their own country and contains no element
of aggression." 37 Article 39 does not, however, require "ag-
gression" as a constituent element of a threat to the major in-
clusive concern.3 8 This is not to imply that an act of aggression
cannot constitute or precipitate a threat to, or breach of, inter-
national peace. The point is that it is not necessary, in order to
support a finding of a threat to the peace, that some act of overt
aggression should have actually been committed. 3 The aggres-
sion argument is thus irrelevant to the determination of a
"threat" under Article 39 of the Charter.
Yet, it must be added that Rhodesian action does involve
elements of aggression in the most comprehensive, relevant
sense. The seizure of control of territory which all states of the
world recognizes to be under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom, accomplished contrary to the desires both of the
United Kingdom and the indigenous population of that territory,
could be appropriately characterized as an act of aggression
against the United Kingdom. Moreover, the promulgation and
application of policies of racism in a context as volatile as that of
Rhodesia and South Central Africa must give rise to expecta-
tions of violence and constitute, if not aggression of the classic
type, at least the creation of circumstances under which states
have been customarily regarded as justified in unilaterally re-
sorting to the coercive strategies of humanitarian intervention.4
37 Acheson, The Washington Post, loc. cit. note 21 above. For comparable
statements, see note 19 above.
"I At the U.N. Conference on International Organization it was suggested,
in regard to Art. 1 (1), that the terms "other breaches of the peace" following
mention of "aggression" be struck as redundant. The suggestion was rejected:
". .. there may be breaches of the peace other than those qualified by present
connotation as aggression and the subcommittee decided to keep "other breaches
of the peace" as an all-inclusive term which implies the use of any means of
coercion or undue external influence ..." U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 723, I/I/A/19,
p. 8, Report of the Rapporteur, Subcommittee 1/a to Committee I/1.
39 Thus a leading commentator criticizes the Charter formulation for redun-
dancy. "The express mentioning of 'acts of aggression' is superfluous since
a half-truth; and the fact that a rebelling group acts in contravention of the
Law of the United Nations 14 (1950).
40 6 Moore, International Law Digest 347-367 (1906); Lauterpacht, Inter-
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Hence, even if aggression were a constituent element of a threat
to the peace, which as demonstrated it is not, the actions of
the Rhodesian elites could supply the contingency for United
Nations action.
The second argument against the lawfulness of the Security
Council decision is that the activities of the Rhodesian elites
have been entirely in accord with international law.41 One
compelling answer is that the Charter does not require a
violation of international law in any sense other than the con-
stitution of a threat to the peace. In point of fact, however,
the list of indictments of Rhodesian transgressions against inter-
national law is alarmingly long. As far as conventional inter-
national law is concerned, the Rhodesian authorities have repu-
diated a number of Security Council decisions, 42 which, under
Article 25 of the Charter, are binding upon all Member
States 43 and which, according to Article 2(6), may be applied
to non-members "so far as may be necessary for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security." 44 They have also
national Law and Human Rights 120 ff. (1950); Murty, Propaganda and World
Public Order:- The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion
83, footnote 16 (1968).
"The International Law of the Future," 399 International Conciliation 268;
38 A.J.I.L. Supp. 55 (1944), provides: "Each state has a legal duty to see
that conditions prevailing within its own territory do not menace international
peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own population in a way
which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or shock the con-
science of mankind."
41 It should require no emphasis that the suggestion that the Rhodesian
elites are acting in contravention of basic policies of international law carries
no implication that they may be appropriately regarded as a state. The notion
that only states may violate international law is no longer accepted as even
a half-truth; and the fact that a rebelling group acts in contravention of the
basic policies of international law is but another good reason for denying it the
benefits of statehood.
42 Res. 221 (1966), April 9, 1966; Res. 232 (1966), Dec. 16, 1966, cited
notes 16 and 17 above.
43 Art. 25 provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter."
44 Even if it should be assumed, contrary to fact, that Rhodesia is a new
state, Art. 2(6) provides: "The Organization shall ensure that states which
are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these princi-
ples so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security." On the innovative character of the provision, see Goodrich and
Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 108-
109 (2d rev. ed., 1949), and, more generally, Kelsen, Peace through Law
38 (1944). Consider, in this regard, the relevance, in converse application,
of the I.C.J.'s dictum in the Reparations case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174: ". . . the
vast majority of the members of the international community, had the power,
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repudiated the human rights provisions of the Charter, 4 as
authoritatively interpreted by the competent U.N. organs, and
the prescriptions of the increasingly authoritative Universal
Declaration.4 1 As far as international customary law is con-
cerned, they have violated the more traditional human rights
policies in a degree which, as we have noted, would have in the
past served to justify "humanitarian intervention" by individual
nation states.4 7 It scarcely need be added that circumstances
which would justify coercive action undertaken unilaterally by
one state must surely be regarded as sufficient to justify orga-
nized international action. As far as "general principles" are
concerned, the Rhodesian elites have violated the principle of
good faith by failing to make effective the assurances which
they gave the United Kingdom at various times for just treat-
ment of the African population. The act of unilateral declara-
tion of independence and the subsequent internal legislation
violated, as will be documented below,' 8 the principle of self-
determination in relation to the great bulk of the Rhodesian
people, as well as British sovereignty. In the most fundamental
sense, the assertion of independence at a time and by means
which the authoritative organs of the international community
had decided would precipitate a threat to the peace of the
surrounding region and the world was an act of irresponsibility
in violation of the most basic policies of the Charter for the
maintenance of international order.
The final argument of the critics of the Security Council
decision is that, even if the acts of the white Rhodesians are
unlawful, they are insulated from international concern by
virtue of the fact that they occur only within Rhodesia and
affect no one else. This bald contention that the actions of the
white Rhodesians occur only within the territorial bounds of
Rhodesia is factually incorrect. In the contemporary intensely
interdependent world, peoples interact not merely through the
modalities of collaborative or combative operations but also
through shared subjectivities-not merely through the physical
movements of goods and services or exercises with armaments,
but also through communications in which they simply take
each other into account. The peoples in one territorial com-
in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing
objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by
them alone . . ." Ibid. at 185; 43 A.J.I.L. 589 at 598 (1949).
45 See Preamble, Art. 1(2), (3), Art. 13(1) (b), Arts. 55 and 56, Art. 62,
Art. 73.
48 General Assembly Res. 217 (III), Dec. 10, 1948; 43 A.J.I.L. Supp. 127
(1949).
41 See note 40 above.
48 See below 
.
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munity may realistically regard themselves as being affected by
activities in another territorial community, though no goods
or people cross any boundaries. Much more important than
the physical movements are the communications which peoples
make to each other. 49 In the case of Rhodesia, the other peoples
of Africa have regarded themselves as affected by the authori-
tarian and racist policies of the Rhodesian elites. In the context
of a world opinion which since World War II has come in-
creasingly to recognize the intimate interdependence of the
maintenance of minimum human rights and international peace
and security,50 it would certainly not be easy to demonstrate to
these peoples that their expectations of grievous injury from the
Rhodesian model are ill-founded. It has been too often con-
firmed that practices of indignity and strife which begin as
internal in physical manifestation in a single community
quickly and easily spread to other communities and become in-
ternational.
It may thus be concluded that the criticisms of the Security
Council decision about Rhodesia in terms of its substantive
merits are quite without merit.- The determination of "aggres-
sion" is not a necessary contingency to the imposition of sanc-
tions under Article 39, though in fact the activities of the Rho-
desian elites would appear to contain elements of aggression.
The activities of the Rhodesian elites have not, as alleged, been
lawful under international law, but have, to the contrary, been
in breach of a variety of fundamental international norms. The
ascription of a complete internality to the Rhodesian activities
is visibly incorrect and, even if it were correct, could not, as
will be demonstrated below, establish an immunity from the
application of Article 39.-1 The decision of the Security Council
would appear, in sum, entirely appropriate in its relation of the
4 For more comprehensive consideration of this aspect of interaction, see
McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decisions," 19 Journal of Legal Education 253, 254 (1967).
oThe intimate nexus between human rights and minimum world order is
clearly articulated in Art. 55 of the Charter: "With a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful andfriendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
(Italics supplied.)
51 See below.
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specific situation before it to the basic substantive criteria both
of the Charter and of customary international law.
* * * The short and conclusive answer to the argument in
terms of domestic jurisdiction is that, once certain activities con-
stitute a threat to international peace and security, they cease to
be, if ever they were, "matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction" of a state.5 4 Still further, even if such activities
should be thought by some unspecified criteria to remain within
the compass of domestic jurisdiction, the very words of the
Charter clause, Article 2(7), which created the vague and elu-
sive limitation upon the organization's competence,5 5 explicitly
provide in a well-known exception that "this principle [that of
domestic jurisdiction] shall not prejudice the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter VII." The basic constitu-
tional framework of an inclusive organization whose principal
purpose is to maintain international peace and security could
scarcely prescribe otherwise: if states were to be permitted to
impede the organized community's efforts to rectify situations by
claims that activities, however threatening, are immune from
inclusive concern because they are within domestic jurisdiction,
54 In this respect, the formal exception, in the final clause of Art. 2(7), to
the operation of the principle of domestic jurisdiction is superfluous: if "the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, decided upon enforcement action,
it would be deciding that the matter threatened international peace and security
and therefore had already gone beyond the limits of domestic jurisdiction."
Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs
of the United Nations 87 (1963). Cf. Lauterpacht, International Law and
Human Rights 177 (1950): "a matter is no longer essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State if it has become a matter of international con-
cern to the extent of becoming an actual or potential danger to the peace of
the world."
55 "The words 'domestic jurisdiction' are neither possessed of any intrinsic
or absolute meaning nor are they self-defining. Neither official pronouncement
nor practice of states has ever given them a very precise meaning for any
purpose, much less of relevance to rational action about human rights in the
contemporary world. Introduced into the Covenant of the League of Nations
on the suggestion of American statesmen in the vain hope of appeasing iso-
lationist sentiment, this 'mischievous phrase' has, in the apt description of a
distinguished critic (Brierly], become a 'new catchword' or verbal 'idol' to
serve the same old function that words like 'sovereignty,' 'independence' and
'state equality' have so long served. That function is much too often to put
a stop to thought, to summarize conclusions reached or unexpressed or perhaps
even unexamined or unconscious grounds, and to assert arbitrary refusal to
negotiate or cooperate on problems regarded by other states as of common
concern." McDougal and Leighton, "The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action," 59 Yale Law
J. 60, 80-81 (1949); Brierly, "Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction," 6 Brit. Yr.
Bk. Int. Law 8 (1925); Bentwich, "The Limits of the Domestic Jurisdiction
of the State," 31 Grotius Society Transactions 59 (1945).
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the principal purpose for which the whole constitutive structure
is established and maintained could be easily defeated.
The invocation of the principle of domestic jurisdiction in
the Rhodesian context is, further, ultimately founded on a
serious misunderstanding of the contemporary relation between
human rights and matters of "international concern." The point
is that, even in the absence of a finding of a threat to the peace,
the United Nations could have acquired a considerable compe-
tence with respect to Rhodesia because of the systematic sup-
pression of human rights practiced there." The concept of
domestic jurisdiction in international law has never been
impermeable 7 Actions occurring within the territorial bounds
of one state with palpable deprivatory effects upon others have
always been subject to claim and decision on the international
plane. There has scarcely ever been a case of major proportions
in which the principle of domestic jurisdiction has not been
invoked; where transnational effects have been precipitated,
the principle has rarely barred effective accommodations in
accord with inclusive interest. Hence, domestic jurisdiction
means little more than a general community concession of pri-
mary, but not exclusive, competence over matters arising and
intimately concerned with aspects of the internal public order
of states. Where such acts precipitate major inclusive depriva-
tions, jurisdiction is internationalized and inclusive concern and
measures become permissible.
The important provision in Article 2(7) of the Charter 58
-that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII"-is only the most
urgent example of the permeability of domestic jurisdiction to
international supervision. Any matter originating in one state
with deprivatory effects going beyond its borders may become
a matter of international concern. The peoples of the world may
regard it as a matter of international concern and their perspec-
56 ". . . human rights and freedoms, having become the subject of a solemn
international obligation and of one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter,
are no longer a matter which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
the Members of the United Nations. Lauterpacht, International Law and
Human Rights 178 (1950).
57 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 4 (1923).
58 Art. 2(7) in conjunction with Art. 39 may be compared, in this regard,
with its counterpart provision in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
According to Art. 15(8) of the Covenant, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice, a determination of domestic juris-
diction, once made, would have precluded an international organization from
participating in the resolution of a dispute, even if the dispute constituted an
inclusive threat to the peace. The Pact of Bogoti suffers from a similar
rigidity, though it is redeemed by recourse available to the Security Council
in instances in which regional processes prove incapable of functioning.
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tives may, from the standpoint of an observer, be realistic.
Recent decades have witnessed tremendous changes in the per-
ception by peoples of their interdependences with respect to
human rights and in their efforts to clarify and establish appro-
priate prescriptions and structures to take these interdepen-
dences into account. Under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter,
it is made basic constitutive prescription that the minimum con-
ditions of a dignified human existence are to be realized and
maintained by Member States by "joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization." " The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights 60 has recommended to all peoples the
enhanced protection of all the more fundamental rights of a
free society and is becoming increasingly more authoritative
through widespread acceptance in decision. Many different con-
ventions for the protection of different particular rights have
been drafted under United Nations auspices and have achieved
varying degrees of promulgation and acceptance. 61 The move-
ment toward a system of enforcement by individual petition,6"
though as yet in but primitive form, is only further corrobora-
59 It is particularly significant that Art. 55 expressly notes the necessary
nexus between the maintenance of human rights and "the creation of condi-
tions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations...." For further discussion, see McDougal' and
Leighton, loc. cit. note 55 above, and Lauterpacht, op. cit. note 56 above:
"the correlation between peace and observance of fundamental human rights
is now a generally recognized fact. The circumstance that the legal duty
to respect fundamental human rights has become part and parcel of the new
international system upon which peace depends, adds emphasis to that intimate
connexion." Ibid. at 186.
60 General Assembly, Res. 217 (III), Dec. 10, 1948, cited note 46 above.
61 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, General Assembly Res. 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960; Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly
Res. 1904 (XVIII), Nov. 20, 1963; 58 A.J.I.L. 1081 (1964); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res. 2200 (XXI),
Dec. 16, 1966, 61 A.J.I.L. 870 (1967). Of particular relevance is the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of 1965, 60 A.J.I.L.
650 (1966), which now has more than sixty signatures and almost a score
of ratifications.
62The initial setback in 1947, when the Commission on Human Rights
severely limited the broad competence granted under Charter Art. 68 and
reiterated in a Commission resolution in 1948, has not barred positive action:
Report of 1st Sess. of Commission Human Rights, E/259, pars. 21-23;
Economic and Social Council Res. 75 (V). For documentation of the process
by which this bar has been steadily eroded, see Statement by Dr. Egon
Schwelb to the Conference of UNA-USA, New York, April, 1967. One recent
example of erosion is in the Optional Protocol to the Proposed Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 61 A.J.I.L. 887 (1967); 4 U.N. Monthly Chronicle
69 (1967).
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tion of important progress in internationalizing concern for
human rights.
* * * The unilateral declaration of independence of November
11, 1965, by the Rhodesian elites was carefully calculated to
animate the highly emotive symbols of self-determination. 67 The
right of self-determination is undoubtedly an important feature
of contemporary international law, though the exact content of
the right, the criteria for its application, and the procedures for
a contextual examination of situations in which it is claimed
have, as yet, not been carefully delineated.68 The earlier experi-
ence with homogeneous ethnic and cultural groups is not wholly
relevant, since recent decades have witnessed a noticeable shift in
emphasis from "groups" and "peoples" to individual human
rights and notions of democracy. In particular, the precise r6le
of the United Nations in supervising the conflicting claims of
groups for self-determination and the regulation of minority
guarantee provisions remain to be successfully determined.69
The Trusteeship Council experience and the Cyprus case are,
however, firm expressions of authority for the proposition that
conflicts of this sort are properly of international concern.
Whatever the difficulties which continue to inhere in the
clarification of appropriate policies about self-determination, the
irrelevance of any such policies for protecting the claims of the
Rhodesian elites would seem to be clear. Whether one invokes
criteria related to the older notions of homogeneous ethnic and
cultural groups or to the newer notions of individual human
rights and democracy, and whether one investigates sociological,
political, psychological or historical factors, by no stretch of the
imagination can the actions and avowed and executed political
programs of the white Rhodesian minority be characterized as
genuine Rhodesian self-determination. It would be a travesty
upon the most basic notion of "self-determination" to speak
of it, in regard to a claim of 6% of a population against 94%
of a population, when the goal of the claim is to gain absolute
political control over the majority and to maintain them in a
state of secondary and powerless citizenship. It would be com-
pletely contrary to the very purposes for which the contempo-
rary right of self-determination has been created to employ it to
justify the systematic suppression of the human rights of the
vast majority of the population for no other reason than to
maintain the social, political, and economic superiority of a
mere six percent of the occupants of the area.
675 Int. Legal Materials 230-231 (1966).
68 For comprehensive treatment, see Mensah, Self-Determination under
United Nations Auspices (Unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School,
1963).
69 Ibid. at 282-324.
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